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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Travis L. Ward appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ward pied guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. (See R., p.108; 
#38733 PSI. 1 ) The district court did not order a new psychosexual or 
psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. (#38722 Tr.,2 p.16, L.8- p.17, L.7.) 
However, several previously-conducted evaluations were attached to Ward's 
presentence investigation report. (See PSI.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed. (Id.) On appeal, Ward alleged his 
sentence was excessive, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court. State v. Ward, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 319, Docket No. 38733 
(Idaho App. January 13, 2012). 
Ward filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.1-11.) Ward 
asserted three claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (2) 
Fifth Amendment violation based upon "having been made to act as a witness 
against himself' and "not having counsel present during all phases of 
evaluations, interrogations;" and (3) "Violation of petitioner[']s Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection clauses." (R., p.6.) 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the presentence report and attachments 
from Ward's underlying failure to register case. (R., p.108.) 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the reporter's transcripts of the 
entry of plea and sentencing hearings from Ward's underlying failure to register 
case. (8/26/13 Order.) 
1 
Ward's ineffective assistance of counsel claim contained three sub-claims: (a) 
trial counsel failed to "keep [him] appraised [sic] of all aspects of the case or to 
make [himself] readily available during critical evaluations"; (b) appellate counsel 
failed to adequately communicate with him; and (c) trial counsel failed to inform 
him of his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to psychological or psychosexual 
evaluations. (R., p.7.) In an accompanying affidavit, Ward also asserted that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the district court order a new 
psychological evaluation in connection with his new failure to register conviction 
(R, p.10.) 
The district court appointed counsel to represent Ward. (R., pp.33-34.) 
Appointed counsel filed a memorandum in support of Ward's petition. (R., pp.43-
48.) The memorandum clarified Ward's petition, stating, "[Ward] has alleged that 
his trial/appellate counsel were ineffective and thereby deprived Petitioner of his 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights." (R., p.44.) 
The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal, in which it 
asserted Ward failed to allege facts that demonstrated either deficiency or 
prejudice with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims expressly 
raised in Ward's petition. (R., pp.49-53, 65-97.) The state also liberally 
construed Ward's petition and supplemental filings as asserting that Ward's trial 
counsel was additionally ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of a 1989 
psychological evaluation which was attached to the PSI. (R., p.73.) The state 
moved for the summary dismissal of this claim as well. (Id.) 
2 
The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal. (R., 
pp.107-124.) The court addressed both the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims expressly raised in Ward's petition, as well as the claim that Ward's trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's consideration of 
the 1989 psychological evaluation. (Id.) Which respect to each claim, the district 
court concluded that Ward failed to raise a prima facie case with regard to the 
applicable Strickland standard. 3 (Id.) Ward timely appealed. (R., pp.125-128.) 
3 Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), a post-
conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate 
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
3 
ISSUES 
Ward states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should the district court's order of summary dismissal be 
reversed because the court dismissed on grounds other than 
those argued by the state in its motion? 
2. Should the district court's order of summary dismissal also be 
reversed because the order did not address Mr. Ward's stand 
alone Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims? 
3. Should the district court's order of summary dismissal as to 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim also be reversed 
because Mr. Ward did raise a genuine issue of material fact 
both as to the deficient performance of trial counsel and as to 
prejudice? 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-6) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ward failed to show the district court summarily dismissed his post-
conviction petition on grounds entirely independent of those set forth by 
the state in its motion for summary dismissal? 
2. Has Ward failed to show that the district court was required to specifically 
address Ward's stand-alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims 
where it granted the state's motion to dismiss in its entirety? 
3. Has Ward failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 




Ward Has Failed To Show The District Court Summarily Dismissed His Post-
Conviction Petition On Grounds Entirely Independent Of Those Set Forth By The 
State In Its Motion For Summary Dismissal 
A. Introduction 
Ward contends that the district court summarily dismissed his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on grounds other than those set forth by the state in 
its motion for dismissal, thereby depriving him of required notice. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-8.) However, a review of the record reveals that the district court 
dismissed Ward's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on substantially similar 
grounds as set forth by the state - that Ward failed to allege facts satisfying the 
applicable Strickland standard. Further, even if the court dismissed the petition 
on entirely independent grounds, any such error is harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
C. The District Court Dismissed Ward's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Claims On Substantially Similar Grounds As Set Forth By The State 
The district court may, on a party's motion or its own initiative, summarily 
dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Ridgley v. State, 148 
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Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2010). The procedure for summary 
dismissal is equivalent to that for a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Thus, dismissal is 
appropriate on determination that no "genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file." & 
Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on 
its own motion, without motion from the state, a petitioner is entitled to notice of 
the basis for the dismissal, and 20 days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b). If the 
state moves to dismiss, the motion serves as notice for which petitioner may 
respond under IC. § 19-4906(c). Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 
123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). The petitioner is entitled to a twenty-day period of time 
to respond to the state's motion. State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 
P.2d 676, 678 (1981); Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098 
(Ct. App. 1999). If the district court dismisses on grounds other than those 
articulated in the state's motion, the petitioner must be given additional notice 
and an opportunity to respond pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). & 
In Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court clarified the distinction in post-conviction appeals between a claim of 
insufficient notice of the grounds for summary dismissal, and a claim that there 
was no notice of the grounds for summary dismissal. An appellant may not 
challenge the sufficiency of the notice contained in the state's motion for 
summary disposition and accompanying memoranda for the first time on appeal. 
19..: at 521-522, 236 P.3d at 1281-1282 (citing DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
6 
602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009)). An appellant may, however, assert for the first 
time on appeal that he did not receive any notice of dismissal, i.e., that the district 
court dismissed the petitioner's claims on grounds entirely independent from the 
ground he was provided notice of in the state's motion and supporting briefs. kl 
In Kelly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to show 
the district court dismissed the post-conviction claims on entirely independent 
grounds where the state provided the applicable Strickland ineffective assistance 
of counsel standard, cited Idaho law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims; and where the district court held that "Kelly has not provided specific facts 
to show that [Kelly's attorney's] behavior fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable representation, and that such a claim was 'unsupported by the 
record."' kl at 522-524, 236 P.3d at 1282-1284. The Court also held that 
"[w]hen a trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-conviction relief 
based in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is sufficient to meet 
the notice requirements." kl at 523, 236 P.3d at 1283 (emphasis in original, 
citations omitted)). 
In the present case, because Ward failed to preserve any claim that the 
state's motion to dismiss provided insufficient notice of summary dismissal, he 
must meet the more stringent standard of showing that the district court 
dismissed the claims in question on entirely independent grounds than set forth 
by the state. Ward cannot make such a showing. 
In his post-conviction petition and supporting affidavit, Ward asserted his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to keep him apprised of all aspects of the 
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case, failing to inform him of his Fifth Amendment rights regarding pre-sentence 
evaluations, and for failing to request a new psychological evaluation. (R., pp.1-
11.) 
In its response and motion to dismiss, prior to discussing Ward's claims 
individually, the state cited the applicable Strickland standard and cited Idaho law 
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (R., pp.69-71.) The state 
summarized that Ward "has raised no genuine issues of material fact, which, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief" under the applicable Strickland standard as to any of his claims. (R., p.74.) 
In addition to addressing the claims expressly raised in Ward's petition and 
affidavit, the state liberally construed Ward's prose petition as also asserting that 
Ward's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of a 1989 
psychological evaluation that was attached to Ward's PSl.4 (R., p.73.) 
Specifically, the state argued: (1) the grounds for relief expressly asserted 
in Ward's petition were too bare and conclusory to substantiate a response; (2) 
Ward could not show his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his 
4 Despite this liberal interpretation of Ward's petition, the state submits that 
Ward's petition and supporting affidavit do not allege that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the district court's consideration of a 1989 
psychological evaluation. Ward's appointed counsel never amended the petition 
to include this claim. "It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of 
action not raised in the party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." Kelly, 149 Idaho 
at 523-524, 236 P.3d at 1283-1284. The state thus asserts, in the alternative, that 
Ward was not entitled to notice on any claim that he did not raise in his petition, 
and that the district court's summary dismissal of the claim in question may be 
affirmed on the ground that the district court erred by considering the claim in the 
first place. 
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Fifth Amendment rights with regard to any post-plea evaluation where he did not 
participate in any such evaluation, and where the guilty plea advisory form 
indicated Ward understood his rights; (3) in light of trial counsel's demonstrated 
strategy at the sentencing hearing, Ward failed to allege facts establishing that 
counsel was objectively deficient in failing to request a new psychological 
evaluation, or that any prejudice resulted; (4) because Estrada v. State, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), 5 is not retroactive, Ward's trial counsel could not 
have successfully challenged the court's consideration of the 1989 evaluation; 
and (5) any attempt to challenge the effectiveness of counsel who represented 
Ward in the 1989 rape proceedings was untimely. (R., pp.65-74.) 
The district court dismissed Ward's post-conviction petition on grounds 
substantially similar to those set forth by the state. The court generally 
concluded that Ward failed to allege facts that would entitle him to relief under the 
Strickland standard as to any of his claims. (R., pp.107-121.) Specifically, the 
court concluded: (1) Ward failed to provide any evidentiary support for his claims 
that his attorney failed to keep him apprised of the case, or that counsel's 
decision not to request a new evaluation constituted deficient performance; (2) 
Ward failed to allege facts demonstrating that his counsel's failure to challenge 
the 1989 psychological evaluation constituted deficient performance because 
counsel did not have a Sixth Amendment obligation to investigate whether the 
prior evaluation was conducted in an unconstitutional manner, and because 
5 In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to 
obtain accurate advice from counsel about his right to remain silent and decline 
participation in a psychosexual evaluation. 
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Estrada is not retroactive; and that in any event, Ward also failed to establish 
prejudice because the district court did not rely on the 1989 evaluation at 
sentencing. (Id.) 
The district court thus dismissed Ward's petition on substantially similar, if 
not precisely identical, grounds as set forth by the state. Because Ward has 
failed to show that the district court dismissed his ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims on grounds entirely independent of those set forth by the state, he 
has failed to show that he was deprived of required notice. 
D. Even If The District Court Dismissed The Petition On Entirely Independent 
Grounds, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
If a petitioner is "not left with an 'invisible target' and is able to respond in a 
meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss," then any lack of 
adequate notice is harmless. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 422-423, 128 P.3d 
948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 671, 
152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to the 
state's motion for summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis for 
dismissal. .. , then we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless 
") error. . 
In this case, to the extent the district court's expressed rationale for 
dismissal was so distinct from the grounds set forth by the state as to render the 
court's order a sua sponte dismissal, any such error is harmless. Ward had full 
opportunity to present evidence and argument as to how he could satisfy the 
deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland. Further, Ward has not attempted 
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to describe what type of argument or evidence he would have presented if only 
he had more precise notice of the grounds for the district court's dismissal of 
these claims. 
Because Ward was not left with an "invisible target," and had the 
opportunity to respond in a meaningful way to the state's argument that he had 
failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the Strickland standard as to any 
of his claims, any error regarding required notice of the summary dismissal of 
those claims is harmless. 
11. 
Ward Has Failed To Show That The District Court Was Required To Specifically 
Address Ward's Stand-Alone Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment Claims Where It 
Granted The State's Motion To Dismiss In Its Entirety 
A Introduction 
Ward contends that the district court erred by failing to consider his stand-
alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) 
Ward's argument fails because the record reveals that the state moved for the 
dismissal of these claims, and the district court granted the state's motion in its 
entirely. 
The district court's dismissal order may also be affirmed on any several 
alternate. First, Ward abandoned these stand-alone claims in his memorandum 
in support of his petition. Further, Ward failed to make use of avenues by which 
he could have challenged the district court's dismissal order below. Finally, even 
if the district court erred in failing to expressly address these claims, no remand 
is necessary because the record reveals an obvious answer to the relevant 
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question, in that Ward failed to support the stand-alone claims with any evidence 
or argument. 
B. The District Court Was Not Required To Expressly Address Ward's Stand-
Alone Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment Claims 
In his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, Ward asserted two claims in 
addition to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Ward asserted: "(b) 
Violations of the Fifth Amendment of [sic] having been made to act as a witness 
against himself, by not having counsel present during all phases of evaluations, 
interrogations; [and] (c) Violations of petitioner['s] Fourteenth Amendment right to 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses." (R., p.6.) Ward did not provide any 
explanation, argument, or evidence relating to these claims. (See R., pp.5-11.) 
Ward's subsequently appointed counsel filed a memorandum in support of 
the petition, which clarified that Ward was "alleg[ing] that his trial/appellate 
counsel were ineffective and thereby deprived Petitioner of his Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights." (R., p.44.) Ward's counsel did not attempt to 
argue the merits of either of the stand-alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims. (See id.) 
In its motion for summary dismissal of Ward's petition, the state argued 
that the asserted grounds for relief in Ward's petition were "too bare and 
conclusory to substantiate a response." (R., p.66.) The state went on to respond 
to the "clarified position" set for in Ward's counsel's memorandum. (R., pp.69-
74.) The state requested the district court to "dismiss the petition." (R., p.74 
(emphasis omitted)). When the district court granted the state's motion (R., 
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pp.107-121), it thus dismissed Ward's petition, and all the claims contained 
within. 
Ward has cited no authority standing for the proposition that a district court 
must expressly address each post-conviction claim when granting a party's 
motion for summary dismissal. Neither of the cases relied on by Ward - Dawson 
v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 234 P.3d 699, 704 (2010), nor 
Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. of California, 163 Cal.App.3d 1126 
(1985), stand for this proposition. In Dawson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the plaintiff's motion for 
relief from judgment. Dawson, 149 at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. In Miramar Hotel 
Corp., a California appellate court held that the trial court erred by failing to issue 
a statement of decision where a party had timely moved for one pursuant to state 
law. Miramar Hotel Corp, 163 Cal.App.3d 1126 Neither case is applicable to the 
present one. In the present case, The district court did not fail to rule on any 
motion, but instead considered and granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Ward's petition. Ward did not move to amend or otherwise challenge 
the judgment. Therefore, Ward has failed to show the district court erred by 
declining to expressly address each of his claims. 
In the alternative, the district court was not required to expressly address 
these claims because Ward abandoned them in the course of the post-conviction 
proceedings. In his memorandum of support, by explaining that he was 
"alleg[ing] that his trial/appellate counsel were ineffective and thereby deprived 
Petitioner of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights," Ward clarified 
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his petition and consolidated these claims. Ward did not attempt to allege or 
present evidence for any stand-alone Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim in 
any subsequent affidavit or other filing. Ward therefore abandoned those stand-
alone claims, and the district court did not err by failing to expressly address 
them. 
Further, Ward failed to make use of other avenues by which he could have 
challenged the district court's dismissal order below. See I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(8) 
(governing motions for reconsideration); I.R.C.P. 52(b) (governing motions to 
amend judgments or to make additional findings); I.R.C.P. 59(e) (governing 
motions for relief from judgment). The Idaho Court of Appeals has encouraged 
the utilization of these rules where petitioners assert procedural errors in post-
conviction proceedings, to give the court an opportunity to take prompt corrective 
actions, or to provide a rationale for its decisions that may be evaluated on 
appeal. See Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370 n. 2, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098 n. 2 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
Finally, the absence of express findings and conclusions may be 
disregarded by the appellate court where the record is clear and yields an 
obvious answer to the relevant question. Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497, 
700 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985); (citing Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 
Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982)). In this case, Ward's stand-alone Fifth 
Amendment and Fourteenth amendment claims, as pied in his petition, were, as 
the state argued in its motion for summary dismissal, "too bare and conculsory to 
substaniate a response." (See R., p.66.) In his petition and supporting affidavit, 
14 
Ward does not even specify what "evaluation" or "interrogation" at which he was 
allegedly deprived the presence of counsel. Further, the petition and supporting 
affidavit is completely devoid of any details or context regarding Ward's 
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Because the bare and conculsory nature of these 
claims yield an obvious answer to the relevant question of whether summary 
dismissal was appropriate, this Court may decline to vacate the district court's 
dismissal order, even if the district court erred by failing to expressly address 
these claims. 
In the alternative, should this Court find that the district court committed 
reversible error by failing to specifically address each of Ward's claims, it should 
vacate the dismissal order and remand the case with instructions for the court to 
rule on the state's motion to dismiss with regard to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims. Through the state's motion, Ward has already been placed 
on notice that the district court may dismiss those claims on the grounds that 
they are bare and conculsory, and thus do not allege facts which, if true, would 
entitle Ward to relief. 
By clarifying the nature of his claim in his post-petition briefing, Ward 
abandoned his stand-alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. This Court 




Ward Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
A. Introduction 
Ward contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the district court's 
apparent utilization of Ward's 1989 psychological evaluation at sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-13.) However, a review of the record reveals that Ward 
failed to allege facts demonstrating either that his trial counsel was deficient, or 
that he was prejudiced by any deficiency under the applicable Strickland 
standard. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
C. Ward Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
16 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the 
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if 
true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. kl ( citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1989)). "Allegations contained in the application 
are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the 
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." 
kl 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally 
deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there 
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is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 
(Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 
(Ct. App. 1999). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, 
do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman 
v. State, 125 Idaho 644,649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case, Ward asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to challenge the 1989 psychological evaluation that was attached to his new 
presentence investigation. Even assuming Ward properly pied this claim, 6 he 
failed to make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Ward 
has failed to allege facts, which if true, establish either deficient performance or 
prejudice under Strickland. 
With regard to deficient performance, it would have been contrary to the 
strategy of Ward's counsel at sentencing to attempt to shield the district court 
from a decades-old psychological evaluation. At the sentencing hearing, Ward's 
counsel referenced Ward's troubled past, but argued that he had made great 
improvements in recent years, and had successfully complied with probation for 
6 As discussed above, it does not appear that Ward actually raised this claim in 
his post-conviction petition. However, the state and the district court both 
addressed it. 
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a period of time. (#38733 Tr., p.31, L.1 - p.35, L.18.) Thus, Ward's counsel's 
demonstrated strategy was to readily acknowledge the life difficulties that were 
described in Ward's earlier evaluations, but to emphasize Ward's improvement in 
the subsequent two decades. Ward did not attempt to show that this strategy 
constituted objectively deficient performance. 
Additionally, Ward cannot show that the Sixth Amendment required his 
counsel to investigate the circumstances of the 1989 evaluation to determine 
whether any of Ward's rights were violated. As the district court recognized (R., 
pp.114-116), trial counsel does not generally have a professional obligation "to 
investigate his client's prior convictions to identify some constitutional infirmity in 
those cases, even where that case was used to enhance his present sentence." 
See Lackawanna County District Attorney, et al. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 294, 403-404 
(2001 ). The same reasoning applies to the present case. An attorney is not 
required to investigate his client's prior evaluations to identify some constitutional 
infirmity, especially where, as here, Ward did not allege that the 1989 evaluation, 
or any district court utilization of it, actually violated any specific right. 
Finally, any attempt by Ward's counsel to object to the presence of the 
1989 evaluation in the presentence report would have been unsuccessful. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has noted, in dicta, that Estrada "did not announce a new 
rule of law entitled to retroactive effect." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46, 218 
P.3d 388, 390 (2009). Ward has failed to cite any authority supporting the 
proposition that a district court may not consider pre-Estrada evaluations in 
sentencing determinations. 
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Ward also failed to allege facts demonstrating prejudice. As the district 
court concluded (R., pp .119-120), there is no evidence in the record that the 
court considered Ward's 1989 evaluation in making its sentencing determination. 
While the district court referenced Ward's "psychological evaluations," and the 
fact that they were "concerning" (#38722 Tr., p.41, Ls.2-11), Ward's PSI 
contained at least seven different evaluations dating back to 1986, as well as the 
PSI from Ward's 1989 rape conviction, and a report from the jurisdictional review 
committee. (See generally #38733 PSI.) Ward cannot show that he was 
prejudiced by any particular evaluation ordered in conjunction with any previous 
criminal case. Nor has Ward pointed to anything particularly prejudicial from his 
1989 evaluation that was not merely cumulative to the information contained in 
other evaluations. 
Ward failed to allege facts, which if true, demonstrate either that his trial 
counsel's performance was deficient, or that any such deficiency resulted in 
prejudice. He has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Ward's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 2014 
MARK W. OLSON 
... 
Deputy Attorney General 
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